Inside the Gaokao: China’s Defining Test with Ruixue Jia

Alex Usher: Hi, I'm Alex Usher and this is the World of Higher Education Podcast.
Every year, over 13 million students in China spend two full days taking the country's university entrance exam, the Gaokao. It's an event that most take years preparing for, starting in primary school, and the results determine not only where students will end up spending their university years, to a large extent it determines their entire life course.
Today my guest is Dr. Ruixue Jia, a professor of economics at UC San Diego, whose co-author of a new book called The Highest Exam, How The Gaokao Shapes China. It's a fascinating little book, which mixes history, social science, and personal experience to explain how the system works, where it came from, how it came to look the way it does. In the discussion that follows, we discuss the history of examinations in China, why the Chinese people are so prepared to accept a single set of exams regulating the life courses of its population, and how Chinese and American systems of hyper selectivity for top universities compare with one another.
I hope you'll enjoy the discussion as much as I did. And now over to Ruixue.
Ruixue, I mean, you make the point in your book that exams have a very long history in China, going all the way back 1500 years to the Tang Dynasty. And that's when the Chinese state invented the concept of exams and of distributing top civil service jobs on the basis of merit. But it also defined merit in a very specific way, which was, what we would now call very academic merit, things like how do you, how do you structure a particular type of poem? And, you know, there's a lot, a lot of questions there about Confucian philosophy and poetry and those kinds of things. How did academic merit as opposed to military merit or something else like that, how did it come to be such a defining feature of the Chinese state, and why did this policy endure so long?
Ruixue Jia: I think, uh, to understand this it may be useful to understand what's the counterfactual, right? What happened before this system, uh, and the ruler, the emperor would generally rely on aristocratic families. Some of these families became aristocrats because of their military power. So think of yourself as a Chinese emperor, you think who would be more loyal to you, right? And the exam is an institution, it's a very clever institution, as we said in the book, to recruit talented people, uh, from commoner families, and then whose loyalty would belong to the Emperor rather than, uh, you know, the, their own big families, right? And then there you can think about different ways, over Chinese history what's the contents of the exam changed a lot. As you said, it was poem at some point, then later become very restricted formatted essay. And today it's science and the technology in some sense. So the context may be not so crucial, but if you want to have some contents to be able to select intelligent people — I think that's the design. Uh, in fact, if, if this happened in other societies as well. I'm not a European historian, but, uh, you think about the very powerful ruler like Louis XIV, uh, in France, or Frederick II in Prussia, they all wanted to reform the civil service. And what they did actually, it's not too different from what the Chinese emperor's, uh, choice. Of course, because you know of some fundamental power differences across society, they didn't manage to sustain it, right? Uh, so that's the, I think the logic of buying loyalty from commoner families is, kind very widespread across societies, but some society like China managed to do so. Uh, but European counterparts didn't manage to do it.
Alex Usher: Let's go back to the start of the 20th century now though, because there are two big things that happen. The first is that, you know, western style universities start popping up, uh, Peking and Tsinghua are both from, uh, around the turn of the 20th century. And of course, the, uh, the empire itself was replaced by a republic. So huge changes. The sponsor of the old exam system disappears. The, the place where the exams were studied for, the Imperial Academies, they disappear, but the exams themselves survive. Why?
Ruixue Jia: Uh, yeah, as you said, the system was abolished in 1905. It's a time where, you know, China lost from many wars and they were, you know, intellectuals and, and the politicians were asking what, you know, what's the reason, what's the root for underdevelopment in China? And some people realize education is the problem, right? The exam system didn't manage to select people, uh, in, you know, in the age of competition between, uh, Europe and China, for instance. And then it was abolished. It wasn't a very successful reform. Uh, we had, we had a research paper showing that after the abolish, uh, people from regions, uh, with higher possibility of, of success from the exam actually became more likely to join revolutionary activities. And this was also realized by the leaders. So when the Republic was founded, the leader, Sun Yat-sen, uh, decided to actually establish a, a branch in the government called the examination branch. You know, there in the US there's three branches of the government in Republic, China, and including this Taiwan still there.
Alex Usher: gonna say Taiwan, it's still there, isn't it? Yeah.
Ruixue Jia: The final branch, the fourth is the examination branch. I think the logic that we see, you know, is a very useful, uh, institution for governance, for selecting talented individuals and who are loyal to the government, right? So it's kind of a natural choice. Even though the contents changed, it's not poem anymore, not, you know, those very restricted essay anymore, but this as a governance mechanism, it survived. Uh, for individuals, they see this as a, you know, mobility channel. They didn't think this as a governance channel. They just want to take this channel to, uh, climb the social ladder and invest a lot in this system.
Alex Usher: Let's move on now just to talk about exams under, the first part of, the Chinese Communist Party's regime, uh, under Mao Zedong. And, you know, reading your book, it struck me, Mao was really the only person in Chinese history who managed to uh, change the minds of the Chinese people, that academic merit on its own was not a reason to promote people to top jobs. Um, you know, I guess he kept exams for the first 15, 16 years, abolished them in 1965. Uh, how did he feel about merit? Like, what was, what happens to the idea of merit and the idea of exams between 1949 and 1976?
Ruixue Jia: He may not be the only one who are skeptical of these exams. Actually, they're, you know, other historical figures who failed from the exam multiple times and became Revolution leaders and trying to to change the system. But coming back to Mao himself, when he was young, he, he admire intellectuals. Uh, he wrote articles for a very leading intellectual magazine called The New Use. Uh, and because of that he got into, uh, the circle of releasing at Peaking University, and he worked in the library as a librarian.
Uh, it's just, I think this type of experience mattered for his later attitude, right? He's, he, he was intelligent, you know, talented young person, but he was not respected by this so-called, you know, meritocratic, uh, intellectual elites. Maybe there is some, you know, revenge later. You see this in, in this, you know, personal experience or in this, all these important leaders, it's difficult, for social scientists it's difficult to study this systematically, but I think we need some political psychology to understand the leaders, including today's leaders, like why did Mr. Trump make all these policies?
Alex Usher: That's very true. Um, so, but let's talk about the political, the, the, the, so you mean you, you made the point, this is kind of a political issue. When Mao dies almost the first thing the Communist party does afterwards is to reinstate exams. I mean, this is even before Deng Xiaoping returns to some position of power in 1978.
In 1977, they reinstate the Gaokao. Why was that so urgent? Why were exams and by extension the, the way that merit is defined, why was that the first of Mao's policies that the Communist Party felt it needed to change?
Ruixue Jia: Uh, as I said, you know, it's not the exam itself, it's a, it's, it's exam is a, is a mechanism for not only like a governance, but also like for economic development because you need human capital, right? You need talented individuals for economic development. So after the cultural revolution, there's just dire need of talent people, because before that, there was college or admission, but the admission was based on family background, especially favoring like peasant, you know, people in the army, right?
And these people, you know, we're not very suitable for developing the economy. So in the eve of, uh, opening up, right? What, what do you need? You need people, talented people. And then what's the mechanism to find out these people? Uh, and the exam comes to, it's very natural, right? Comes to mind as a mechanism.
So in 1977, they had the first, uh, restored, the first, uh, uh, Gaokao, uh, in this modern version. And it's like, it's amazing, you know, uh, cohort because there are people from very, very young age, like 16, to people who are like 40, because they wasted their life in the cultural revolution, they also took chance.
So at that time, um, I think that year, the admission rate was about 4%, among the exam takers. So, and it's, you know, it's, it's more competitive than Harvard and Stanford today. Uh, you know, nowadays it's totally different, uh, world.
Alex Usher: Well, let's talk about nowadays. Obviously a lot's happened in the last 50 years. What have been the major changes in the Gaokao system since 1977?
Ruixue Jia: I think the most important change is the scale. Uh, I mentioned that, you know, in 1977, 4% of admission rate, so guess what's the admission rate today? It's 80%. And it's not only that, it's also the 10 million, uh, students each year, uh, taking this exam. And 8 million would go to a certain college. So being a college, uh, student, meaning college graduates. It's very different, right? It's, it is very, very valuable, uh, in 1970s and eighties. Now it's so common that it's not so valuable. What's become very, very valuable is the elite college, right? So one element we emphasize in the book is this hierarchical structure of the whole society, which is reflected by the education system.
So now it's not too difficult to go to one college. You know, most people can send their kids to a college, but why did they still, why do they still invest so much in this system? Because they want to go to send their kids to the elite college. And the elite college admission rate is still 5% or 4% after 5%. So in that sense, this, uh, nature of competition, uh, you know, didn't change even though the scale and the scope, changed greatly.
Alex Usher: We're gonna take a short break. We'll be right back.
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Alex Usher: And we're back. Ruixue, you just described, uh, the before the break, you, you described the Gaokao as a national competition, but actually these exams are provincial, aren't they? Like It is a national institution, but the um, uh, you know, the exams are provincial, and universities recruit on a provincial basis as well, right? So, so people don't, there's not a single national mark that will get me into, you know, into Tsinghua University or Fudan University. Um, so the ability to use good test results to access top institutions varies quite a bit. Why? Why isn't the Gaokao truly a national system?
Ruixue Jia: Yeah, and this is related to the very, uh, a longstanding institutional feature called the quota system. Uh, different province get different quota. It's still national or centralized, as we highlight in the, in the book. It's, the quota was decided at the uh, central level, right? By the Ministry of Education, it assigned to different provinces, and this province would've had, you know, their own examination. They happened at the same day, uh, at nationally, but they have their own exam, they, they, uh, market, the them, uh, the, within that province and direct students, uh, within that province. Uh, and it's very unequally distributed, uh, to the quota. Uh, just give you some numbers. I was talking about acceptance to Elite college, right? Average is like 5%. The top 100, colleges accepted 5% of the exam takers. And if you come from Beijing or Shanghai, uh, the rate would be 16%. And if you come from my province, which is Shandong Province, the exception rate would be 3%.
So, there's huge variation and why, and again, it's a political economy, uh, logic. Uh, so from the central government point of view, which regions are more politically important, these are the metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai, and the provinces with a, a large share of minority population, which is like Tibet and Xinjiang, and the provinces that get lost, from this, uh, distribution, uh, is the central provinces like Shandong, Hainan or Guangdong.
Alex Usher: Right. So, you know, I think around the world, it's generally acknowledged nowadays that examination results are to a large extent, a function of socioeconomic background. Like richer families can invest more, they can hire the tutors, they can, they can arrange their lives so that, you know, to live in the right part of town and get into the right middle schools or, or senior high schools, those kinds of things. Now, in 1977, when China was poor but equal, um, I suppose an exam might make a lot of sense, right? A an academic, a, a strong STEM oriented exam, that might make sense, it might be seen as fair. But now China's rich and unequal, and, and you know, obviously the rich have an access to a lot more parental assistance. I imagine, I mean, you, you point out in the book, uh, you know how unequal exam results are based on, family income. Uh, but it hasn't, I don't think dented the Chinese people's view that the Gaokao is a fair examination of merit. Why is that?
Ruixue Jia: Ya, I totally agree with you that this institution worked well in the seventies and eighties and even nineties. Uh, and I, I took the exam in 2000. Uh, I think at that time it's, it works well in terms of promoting social mobility, but as you said, now all the families have certain degree of resources to invest in their children and some families has much more resources, right?
It's becoming a, actually a burden and it's becoming more and more unequal. But you ask them why would it, you know, the people still like this system, right? It's not that they are naive thinking, oh, the exam score would reflect my merit. Uh, I think the key here is against the counterfactual, right? What would be the alternative?
And as you and the listeners might know, China is a society knowing for corruption and the network and, and the power influence everywhere, right? So the, I think the fundamental reason that people don't have a lot of trust in these institutions, it's actually out of fear that they prefer this exam system, right? Without the system, you know, how could the, opportunity be located naturally, you know, power and the network would matter even more, right? And that's why that's, you know, this outside options worse so that families still think given the, you know, societal structure, it's better to, is more objective measure, at least, is more transparent, right, than the other ways of recruitment of, uh, of colleges.
Alex Usher: So I think transparency is an interesting word there, right? Because I was, I was gonna say that, uh, you know, the United States now has a, an admission system to its top universities that is as selective as China's, but they use different measures.
Ruixue Jia: Mm-hmm.
Alex Usher: And they are more multidimensional, right? It's not just how you do on the exam, uh, but as you say, the, the other elements aren't necessarily transparent. Is that really why China, you know, I guess the Chinese people aren't interested in multi-dimensional, um, examinations of merit? Is it just transparency, or is there something about the academic merit, right? Because I think there are Confucian notions of, of, um, goodness and justice that are associated with, studying, right? That come from Confucius. Like, what's the reason there that they're not interested in things like athletics or you know, debate club or those kinds of things.
Ruixue Jia: I think, uh, I think this is also related to this, you know, the, uh, lawsuits right about Asian, uh, parents suing Harvard, uh, for, you know, uh, less transparent admission system and the potential discrimination. I see there's three reasons why, uh, this, uh, uh, happened. I think one, one is that what you mentioned is this culture transmission, right?
As I said, you know, growing up in China, you are constantly worried, uh, being taken advantage by power or people more power from, uh, than your family. Uh, so that's one reason. Of course when people, when Chinese people move to the US they also carry this culture, right? Uh, a second reason I see is that, you know, being immigrant actually make this even more, makes you more likely to demand something objective and transparent, because immigrants typically don't have a lot of social capital, uh, and that would strengthen, uh, this, uh, view. And the third one may be related to what, what your point, or partly related to your point is that you know, at least in the Chinese immigrant case, these are people who actually were successful from the exam system, right? So they became successful through this system. They like this
Alex Usher: So it must be the right system.
Ruixue Jia: Also they thought, well, as you said, they are proud of their learning, right? And, and the, and their learning seems to be very well respected, at least in the Chinese society. I think that's strengthened, uh, the view. And I think all this work together, but I think fundamentally is still the alternative, whether the alternative could be better. If China had a very different institution, let's say, you know, if power were much more checked, if people could trust, you know, all the universities, then you know, they'll be more relaxed and more, you know, demand for multiple dimension. Because, you know, people also complained a lot about the exam system, right? About teaching to the test, about you know, how this, uh, actually stifled certain dimensional ability. They all realize this. It just, the other choice was not, is not better. And I think that's the key.
Alex Usher: Uh, well, I guess that then that had something to do with why the Chinese government tried to ban, uh, or, or greatly restrict, tutoring schools, um, you know, in the last few years.
Let me ask you a last question because I think your answer points to a potentially interesting future for China. You know, as you say, this is, typically exams have been used in Chinese history when you have a vast population, a very few number of spots, to, uh, to assign, and so you've needed a very effective uh, screening measure. But now, you know, the university system is growing, maybe even the number of good universities is growing, and the youth population is shrinking rapidly. So this combination of economics and demographics, you know, material abundance, um, and, fewer young people, that might have an effect on the need for the kinds of exams that China uses, no? Like if we were doing this interview, uh, in 2050, how different do you think the situation might be?
Ruixue Jia: Great question. 25 years sounds very long. But on the other hand, thinking about thousand or Chinese years history, 25 years is very short. Uh, so part to me, I kind of wish there would be big changes, right? Especially with new technology of AI and with big change in demography. But part to me is very skeptical about big changes, uh, because fundamentally it's the education matters as a, a stratification mechanism, right? And the, the one feature we emphasize in the book is that Chinese society has been for so long, you know, more than 25 years, right? It's like more than a thousand years, it's a centralized, hierarchical, uh, you know, we call it tournament, centralized hierarchical tournament. And to be successful in such a tournament then you have to, you know, work very hard and, this could be different dimension. You know, it could be in the past, you know, you have to be very good at poems, and today you have to be very good at STEM. But this is all like, uh, tools rather than, than really the fundamentals. So to make a societal change, I think more importantly is to change the, the fundamental structure, right?
If Chinese society could become less hierarchical, uh, and less tournament-like, and a a bit less centralized, then there will be fundamental change. Uh, so that's my conjecture. So I would just, if you ask me, I could be totally wrong, but I would say despite these changes, maybe the, the fundamental change would be minor.
Alex Usher: Ruixue, thank you so much for joining us today.
Ruixue Jia: Thank you.
Alex Usher: And it just remains for me to thank our producers, Tiffany MacLennan and Sam Pufek and you, our listeners, for joining us today. If you have any questions or comments about the episode, please don't hesitate to contact us at podcast@higheredstrategy.com. Join us next Thursday when our guest will be Debbie McVitty. She's the editor of the UK Higher Education website, Wonkhe, and she's joining us to talk about the release of the UK Government's White Paper on post 16 education. Bye for now.